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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This appeal is from a final order in a formal adjudicative proceeding of the Utah Labor
Commission. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78A-4-103(2)(a) for
Court of Appeals Cases. The Appellate court has jurisdiction to grant relief because the Labor
Commission "has erroneously interpreted or applied the law" (Utah Code Annotated§ 63G-4403(4)(d)) and has made a ruling based in part upon a "determination of fact that is not supported
by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court (Utah Code
Annotated§ 63G-4-403(4)(g)).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE & STANDARD OF REVIEW

Issue: Did the commission err in its application of the facts of this case in arriving at the legal

conclusion that there was minimal control by the employer, Air Systems, and minimal benefit to Air
Systems by Air Systems' employee Mr. Davis' use of an Air Systems truck while traveling directly
to a jobsite from his home on August 14, 2015, considering the regular and months long overall
practice, pattern, and program of Air Systems' providing a truck to Mr. Davis and allowing him to
use their truck exclusively for business purposes such as commuting between home and various
jobsites as well as use of the Air Systems' truck to transport construction materials and tools on
other occasions both on the way from home to work, on the way home from work, and between
jobsites and the Air Systems business office-and all this essentially on an on call basis during
11

regular work hours-as a basis for making the further finding that the instrumentality" exception to
the "going and coming" rule in a course of employment determination did not apply.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Standard of Review- Findings of Facts and Marshaling of Evidence-Argument for
consideration of all marshaled evidence: In reviewing industrial commission orders an
appellate court "defer[s] to the Commission's findings of fact unless it makes findings not supported
~

by substantial evidence." (Bennet v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 726 P.2d 427, 429 (Utah 1986) citing
Pinter Construction Co. v. Frisby, 678 P.2d 305, 307 (Utah 1984). In this case the Commission
recited a summary of the facts and generally adopted the findings of fact of the administrative law
judge. (AR 53). The findings by the commission and ALJ are accurate as far as they go and are not
contested. However, there were important details that were not included specifically in the

~

commission's findings that are helpful in deciding the issue of control. Therefore in the section on
Relevant Facts Appellant has cited to other portions of the hearing transcript that provide additional
details. These additional details, along with the findings of the ALJ and the commission constitute
a complete marshaling of all of the evidence about how the work accident happened and its
surrounding circumstances. The record is not extensive and the relevant facts are all set forth in
the section on Relevant Facts. (see this brief pp. 9-14)
The additional citations to the hearing transcript should be considered by this court in
determining the issue of whether Mr. Davis was in the course of employment with regard to the
going and coming rule when he was killed travelling from his home in an employer owned truck to a
job site as he and the truck rolled off the edge of a road and down a steep hill-a mixed question of
law and fact which is raised in this appeal-- because "the evidence is essentially uncontradicted."
(see Bennet v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 726 P.2d 427, 429 (Utah 1986); citing to Rustler Lodge v.
Industrial Commission, 562 P.2d 227, 228 (Utah 1977)) For when, as in this case, "the evidence in
the case is largely uncontradicted, the problem is not so much one of examining the record to
5
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determine whether the evidence preponderates for or against the conclusion of the Commission,
but rather of determining whether the Commission drew the correct legal conclusion therefrom."
(Rustler Lodge v. Industrial Commission, 562 P.2d 227, 228 (Utah 1977) citing Stover Bedding Co.
v. Industrial Commission, 998 Utah 423, 107 P.2d 1027, 1028 (1940)).

~

On that basis, therefore,

the appeals court should consider all of the evidence set forth in the section on Relevant Facts
(with citations to the appellate record) in making the required determination of law. In an
alternative view, because the commission left out important and relevant facts, the commission's
limited findings, or the failure of the commission to address some of the findings in its analysis do
not constitute a sufficient and proper basis upon which to make a correct determination with regard
to the issue of the going and coming rule in this case. Therefore, those limited factual findings,
though accurate, are not supported by substantial evidence as a whole because they do not
constitute a complete consideration of all uncontradicted facts (see Utah Code Annotated §63G-4403(4)(g) and need to be supplemented by the additional record of proceedings provided in the
section on Relevant Facts. And the Appellant, Geneinne Ellen Davis, represents, as was also
represented above, that the section on Relevant Facts constitutes a complete marshaling of all of
evidence in this case which is relevant to the appeals court's determination of whether the work
accident occurred in the course of Mr. Davis' employment.

Standard of Review--Application of Standard to Facts:
The standard of review for this case, determining whether the commission correctly or
incorrectly denied benefits, is a traditional mixed question of law and fact. (see Jex v. Utah Labor
Com'n, 2013 UT 40, ,r 15, 306 P.3d 7999, 803; citing to Murray v. Labor Comm'n, 2013 UT 38, ,r
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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~

34, 308 P.3d 461, 472) The standard to be used when reviewing a mixed question can be either
deferential or non deferential. (see Jex, at 803 ,r 15, citing to Murray, at 473

,r 36).

Whether

benefits are barred by the going and coming rule is a mixed question which is fact-like because the
factfinder is in a superior position to decide it so the commission's decision denying benefits should
be entitled to deference. (see Jex at 803 ,r 16). However, if the commission has failed to consider
and discuss important relevant facts or factors in its analysis and/or the commission errs in failing
to discuss and analyze a matter in accord with procedures set forth in law the deference to the
commission decision is necessarily eroded to the extent of its errors. Such errors in analysis would
~

constitute an "erroneous□ appli[cationf' of the law (Utah Code Annotated §63G-4-403(4)(d), or at
least a failure to fully explain an appropriate analysis of the law sufficient to determine whether its
application of the law was correct. And the omission of important factual considerations could
certainly constitute "a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not supported
by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court." (Utah Code
Annotated §63G-4-403(4)(g)).

DETERMINIATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated § 34A-2-401 (1) An employee described in Section 34A-2-104 who
is injured and the dependents of each such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of and
in the course of employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the accident was not purposely selfinflicted, shall be paid:

(a) compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury or death; (b)

the amount provided in this chapter for:

(i) medical, nurse, and hospital services; (ii) medicines;

and (iii) in case of death, the amount of funeral expenses.
7
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case: This case is an appeal by the Appellant, Geneinne Davis, from a Utah
Labor Commission Order (Order Affirming ALJ's Decision) dated 12/9/2016. (see Appellate
Record-hereinafter "AR" 53-57)
B. Course of Proceeding: Geneinne Ellen Davis filed an Application for Hearing with the

Utah Labor Commission on 9/10/2015 requesting workers compensation benefits for the
death of her husband which he suffered while traveling to work in an employer owned truck
on 8/14/2015. (see Application for Hearing; AR 1-6) On 12/4/15 the employer, Air Systems
Inc. and its workers compensation carrier filed an answer denying the claim with a defense
that Mr. Davis was not in the course and scope of his employment when he was injured.
(see AR 10-12) A hearing on the Application was held on 6/16/2016 (see Notice of
11

11

Hearing AR 13). The Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter ALJ entered an Order on
)

8/12/2016 finding that Mr. Davis was not in the course and scope of employment when he
was killed. (see AR 26- 30). Geneinne Davis appealed the decision by filing a Motion for
Review dated 9/12/16 (see AR 32-41, the employer and workers compensation carrier filed
a response on to Geneinne Davis' Motion for Review on 9/27/2016. (see AR 43-51) On

12/9/2016 the Labor Commission entered a final Order affirming the ALJ's decision. (see
AR 53-57) The Appellant, Geneinne Davis, now appeals that Order.

8
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RELEVANT FACTS
1. The Labor Commission stated facts, indicating that it adopts and summarizes Judge
11

Marlowe's findings of facts and finds additional facts from the record to be material to Ms.
Davis' motion for review" (see AR 53) as follows:

a. Mr. Davis was killed in an automobile accident while driving a vehicle owned by Air
11

Systems, Inc. ("Air Systems") to work at a construction site on August 14, 2015."
(see AR 53).

b.

11

Mr. Davis worked for Air Systems installing air-conditioning units and duct work on

various construction projects in and around the Salt Lake area. Mr. Davis drove a
pickup truck owned by Air Systems back and forth from his home to the
construction□

sites where he worked. Mr. Davis kept personal tools as well as

~

construction materials owned by Air Systems in the truck. Air Systems paid the
cost of fuel for the vehicle and paid Mr. Davis for the time he spent picking up items
from vendors or stopping by Air Systems' office, but it did not pay Mr. Davis for the
time he spent commuting from home to work." (see AR 53-54)
c.

11

ln August 2015 Mr. Davis had been working at two construction sites in Park City

for about six months. The two sites were close to each other and Mr. Davis would
park the truck he drove in a public area and walk between the two sites. On the
morning of August 14, 2015, Mr. Davis was driving the truck owned by Air Systems
from his home to the construction site via Guardsman Pass when the truck went off
Qt)

the road on a sharp curve and rolled down the steep mountainside. Mr. Davis was
ejected from the vehicle and killed." (see AR 54)
9
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d.

11

Air Systems' owner and president, Duane Bailey, testified at the evidentiary

hearing that the main purpose of providing trucks to employees like Mr. Davis was
to help get them to and from a construction project, although they also used the
trucks to pick materials up from supply houses. Mr. Baily described that his
employees were allowed to drive company trucks to ensure their availability to work
and also to use the trucks for transporting tools and materials ... " (see AR 54, see
'1)

a/so AR 58 Transcript p. 31 lines 8-17)

e. " Mr. Bailey testified that on the morning of the accident, Mr. Davis did not stop by
Air Systems' office or at a vendor and was not transporting construction materials at
the time ... " (see AR 54) and "Mr. Davis was not performing any job-related service
to Air Systems on the morning of the accident even if he did use the truck to

~

transport construction materials on other occasions. Additionally, Mr. Davis was not
engaged in a special errand for Air Systems, he was not compensated for his time
commuting to work, and the accident did not occur on Air Systems' premises." (AR

~

55) (see a/so AR 58 Transcript p. 31 lines 8-21-testimony by Mr. Bailey, owner of
Air Systems-- "A Well yeah. They pick up materials up at supply houses and at
the shop as they (inaudible) around there. We put them on will call and they
make-they come up or-pick them up, bring them to the shop and pick-you
know, there are a variety of options there. Q

OK. But at the time of this accident,

the truck had not - as far as you know, the truck had not been used for that
purpose; is that correct? A Correct.") (and at AR 58 p. 30 line 8 through line 13-"Q

Okay, Had Mr. Lewis gone into the shop before going to work, as far as you
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10

~

know? A

No. Q Was he carrying materials, that you're aware of, that were to

be used for the job that day? A
f.

No.

11
)

"Mr. Davis was not required to be at the place where the accident occurred; he
apparently chose to drive over Guardsman's Pass in order to get to the construction
site rather than taking another route." (AR 55; see also AR 27) With there being no
evidence that Air Systems directed the route Mr. Davis should take it could be
inferred that Air Systems gave no specific directions regarding the route Mr. Davis
should take to work. (see also AR 27)

~

2. The ALJ found facts, which the Commission indicated that it adopted and summarized, as
follows:
a. "Mr. Davis drove a Ford F-150 two door truck that was owned by Air Systems. In
the truck Mr. Davis kept his own personal hand tools including such things as drills,
tin snips, and bending tools, and he also carried in the truck equipment and
materials belonging to Air Systems, such as ladders, a crane, sheet metal, bolts
and screws, which he used to accomplish his work." (see AR 27)
b.

11

Mr. Davis was assigned to work at various construction sites all over Salt Lake

Valley, as well as various sites in Park City, Utah. He was allowed to commute
between his home and the work sites in the company truck. Sometimes another
employee accompanied him. Mr. Davis also used the truck to pick up materials and
equipment from Air Systems' office, as well as supply vendors. He had a company
credit card to pay for gas in the truck. Mr. Davis was not paid for the time he
commuted to and from work. However, if he were to stop at Air Systems' office or a
11
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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vendor to pick up items, he was considered to be on the clock and was paid." (see
~

AR27)

c. "On August 14, 2015 Mr. Davis left for work at about 6:00 a.m. as usual. He was
~

going to a job site in Park City, where he had been working for about 6 months.
There is no evidence that he stopped at Air Systems' office or at a vendor prior to
heading for Park City. Mr. Davis occasionally drove to Park City over Guardsman

<0J

Pass, which he did this day. He was alone in the truck. According to the police
report containing witness testimony, the sun had come up when Mr. Davis reached
(iqj

the top of the pass, and his vehicle went off the side of the road on a sharp curve
and rolled down th~ steep mountainside. He was ejected from the truck and died.
Mr. Davis' personal tools were recovered from the mountainside, and the truck was

(gj

eventually returned to Air Systems. There were no materials found that had been
hauled in the truck." (see AR 27)
~

d. On the date of the accident while Mr. Davis was on his way to the jobsite, "Mr.
Davis was not using the truck for any special work errand and would not have been
compensated for his travel time that morning. (see AR'28)

~

3. There are similar facts in the record with some additional relevant details which do not
contradict any of the facts as stated by the Labor Commission or the adopted facts of the
~

ALJ as follows:
a. The most recent employment period during which Mr. Davis worked for Air Systems
as a sheet metal journeyman started about 9 months prior to the date of Mr. Davis'
death on August 14, 2015. During that time Mr. Davis worked exclusively for Air
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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~

Systems. The business office and shop of Air Systems was in Salt Lake about a
half hour drive from Mr. Davis' home address. (see Hearing Transcript, AR 58 p. 10
line 25 through p. 12 line 8.)
b. During his time at Air Systems Mr. Davis always used an Air Systems company
pick-up truck to go to work. He never used his own vehicle-- a four-door passenger
car-- to go to work or transport tools 1materials or supplies to and from the jobsites.
He kept the company truck at his home in the drive way when not at work. (see AR
58 Transcript1p. 13 line 5 through p. 14 line 15; p. 17 line 20 through p. 19 line 2)
c. On occasion Mr. Davis commuted with another Air Systems' employee, a coworker1 with the co-worker coming to Mr. Davis' house and getting a ride in the Air
Systems truck to a job site. (see AR 58 Transcript p. 19, line 3 through line 22)
d. Mr. Davis would use the truck, not only for travelling to the various job sites all over
the Salt Lake Valley and in the Park City area1but he would also use the truck to go
between home, jobsites, supply shops, and the Air Systems shop to pick up and
transport materials and tools for use in his work for Air Systems. Mr. Davis would
carry in the truck work supplies, sheet metal, different ladders and other materials
and tools he would need for a particular job. These were his own tools as well as
Air Systems tools such as ladders and lifts. (see AR 58 Transcript p. 14 line 7
through p. 15 line 16; and see AR 58 Transcript p. 15 line 17 through p. 17 line 12 &
p. 19 line 25 through p. 20 line 21; and see AR 58 p. 33 line 5 through p. 34 line 23)
4'

e. A large metal gang box with locks on it was put on the jobsite for the employees to
store their own and Air Systems' tools on a job-site for safe keeping and also so
13

l.:o
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they didn't have to transport tools every day to the jobsite because the Air Systems
owner indicated the company work vehicles were primarily used to get employees
to and from work project sites. Furthermore, sometimes employees couldn't park
the company trucks right by a jobsite so the gangbox was helpful in that they didn't
have to store and transport tools in the company trucks when working at a particular
jobsite. (see AR 58 Transcript p. 30 line 14 through p. 31 line 11)
f.

~

Mr. Davis was also required to take the company truck in for regular service for
things such as oil changes at a place the company maintained an account for such
services for their vehicles. (see AR 58 Transcript p. 31 line 22 through p. 32 line 2;
AR 58 p. 37 line 17 through p. 38 line 4) Air Systems had purchase accounts at
third party vendors so employees, including Mr. Davis, could pick up and purchase
needed materials. (see AR 58 Transcript p. 38 lines 5 through 9)

g. At the Park City job sites Mr. Davis would on occasion take a ladder from the shop
~

and if there were any other tools or equipment he needed to deliver to the two
particular Park City job sites he would need to park temporarily in the front and then

~

move to a parking place. (see AR 58 Transcript p. 33 lines 5 through 25)
h. The Air Systems owner testified that Mr. Davis would on occasion go to the main
office for business or supplies and then go to the jobsite, and Mr. Davis would on
occasion, before going to work or in the middle of the day or after work, go to a
vendor to pick up some miscellaneous supplies or tools. (see AR 58 Transcript p.
34 lines 1-23)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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i.
~

The Air Systems owner said all of the vehicles they provided to employees were
trucks and they had no economy cars, indicating that having trucks generally was a
benefit to Air Systems in order to haul things on an as needed basis. He said,
11

Well, we're in the construction industry, and construction guys use trucks, so-on

the days-then it would put me at a disadvantage on the days that he needs to haul
something." (AR 58 Transcript p. 35 lines 7 through 19 and p. 36 lines 2 through 8)
~

j.

The Air Systems owner said, "the truck is like a perk where I'm providing the gas to
get guys to the job, because construction workers are notorious for not having
driver's licenses, they're out of gas all the time. It's just part of the construction
industry where you give key employees trucks for availability and you pay for their
gas, and it's something so that I don1t have to pay the travel time, to make sure that

~

everybody gets to the jobsite, and then also use it for tools. I pay for the gas and the
truck and insurance on the truck ... " and pay time for travel between job sites and
the Air Systems shop. (AR 58 Transcript p.36 line 20 through p. 37 line 16; see
also AR 58 Transcript p. 37 line 17 through p. 38 line 4)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The evidence shows that Air Systems provided Mr. Davis a company truck for allowed use
that demonstrates a regular and months long overall practice, pattern, and program of Air Systems'
allowing Mr. Davis to use their truck exclusively for business purposes, including commuting
@

between home and various jobsites, in addition to use of the truck to transport construction
materials, tools, and coworkers on the way from home to work, on the way home from work, and
15
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

QiJ

between jobsites, third party vendors, and the Air Systems business office-and all this essentially
~

on an on call basis during regular work hours. The commission erroneously failed to consider that
established months long business use in determining that Mr. Davis' use of the Air Systems truck
did not qualify for the "instrumentality" exception to the going and coming" rule in a course of
11

employment determination. Appropriate consideration and analysis of all of the undisputed and un
contradicted evidence will result in a conclusion that Mr. Davis' early morning drive from home
directly to a job site on August 14, 2015, the date of the fatal accident, was an integral part of a
months long overall practice, pattern and program of Air Systems allowing Mr. Davis to use their
pick-up truck for business purposes which shows a combination of significant control by Air
Systems of such use and significant benefit to Air Systems by such use such that Mr. Davis'
commute from home to a jobsite on the date of the accident was in the course and scope of his
employment.

ARGUMENT
Introduction
The question involved in this case is whether the Labor Commission denied benefits
appropriately in determining that Mr. Davis' injury and death by automobile accident travelling from
home to a construction job site in an employer provided vehicle did not occur "within the course
of... employment under the Utah Labor Commission Act. (see UTAH CODE § 34A-2-401 (1 ). At
issue in this case, as it was in the Jex case {see Jex at 083-04

,r 19-20), is the

11

instrumentality"

exception to the "going and coming" rule. It is the general rule that going to and coming from work
is not in the course of employment and industrial coverage will be denied. The courts, however,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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have recognized the instrumentality exception to the going and coming rule starting with Bailey v.

Industrial Commission. (see Jex at 804 ! 25); citing to Bailey v. Industrial Com'n, 298 P.2d 545,
546-4 7 (Utah 1965)) In Bailey, the instrumentality exception was applied to a Mr. Bailey who as
the owner of his own company utilized a station wagon for exclusive use in the business-- as a
workers comp covered employee of his own company-and who was injured on the way to his
business site, a service station in Lehi. (see Bailey. at 546). Jex indicated that "even in going and
~

coming a vehicle may be in the course of employment if it is an instrumentality of employer's
business in light of the employer's benefit from and control over it." (Jex at 801 !19; citing to Bailey
~

at 546).
Also, in essential application of this instrumentality exception the supreme court, in Salt

Lake City Corp. v. Labor Com'n, (Salt Lake City Corp. 2007 UT 4, 153 P.3d 179 (2007) determined
that a police officer commuting home to Tooele from a work meeting in Salt Lake City in a Salt
Lake City police patrol car, under the 'Take Car Home Program" (Id. at 181 ! 5 & 6), was within the
(,)

course of employment. (Id. at 184 ! 27) Most recently, in 2013, the supreme court took occasion in

Jex to clarify the instrumentality exception. Jex, was different than Bailey and Salt Lake City Corp.
because it was a case where the employee was driving his own personal vehicle and claimed that
his use of his own vehicle conferred benefits on the employer's business by such use. (Jex at 80304 !19) In denying the application of the instrumentality exception in that case, the Jex court
reviewed, clarified, and explained the exception and indicated that the instrumentality exception in
all cases hinges on two separate factors-11 control" by the employer and "benefit" to the employer.
~

(Id. at 807 ! 37 & 38) The Jex court indicated that
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"the ultimate question is whether the use of a vehicle in "going and coming' is nonetheless
within the 'scope of employment. And that question must be answered by considering and
balancing both the benefit to the employer and the nature and extent of the employer's
control." (Id.)
11

~

In this case under the Jex mandated analysis the combination of control by the employer,

•r: .

Air Systems, over Mr. Davis' use of the Air Systems vehicle and also the benefits conferred upon
Air Systems by Mr. Davis' use of their vehicle should be analyzed to determine whether that
combination of both the control and benefit is sufficient to for a finding of the instrumentality
exception. Appropriately analyzed the particular facts of this case-- not only considering Mr. Davis'
use of the Air Systems' truck on the day of his death by automobile accident, but considering also
Air Systems' pattern, practice, and program of allowing Mr. Davis regular use of their truck on a
months long exclusive business use (including commuting) basis-- both the control of such use by
Air Systems and the benefits provided to Air Systems by such use are significant. Thus, Mr. Davis'
use of the Air Systems vehicle should fall under the instrumentality exception and be considered
within the course of employment.

~

Control
The factors of control-some of which merit consideration also under an analysis of benefit
conferred on the employer--which indicate significant control by Air Systems of Mr. Davis use of
the company truck include the following facts specifically mentioned by the Labor Commission ·or
ALJ facts adopted by the Commission: The vehicle was owned by Air Systems (AR 53); Air
Systems paid the cost of fuel for the vehicle (AR 27, 54); Air Systems provided a credit card to Mr.
Davis to pay for gas in the truck (AR 27); There is no indication of specific allowance for personal

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18

use as it was indicated that Mr. Davis was allowed to commute between his home and various Air
Systems work sites in the company truck for work purposes (AR 27);The "main reason employees
like Mr. Davis were allowed to drive company-owned trucks was to get them to a construction
project"(AR 55); after the accident the truck was returned to Air Systems (AR 27); Mr. Davis carried
or transported in the truck equipment and materials belonging to Air Systems, such as ladders, a
crane, sheet metal, bolts. and screws. which he used to accomplish his work (AR 27); Mr. Davis
was assigned by Air Systems to work at various construction sites all over the Salt Lake Valley, as
well as various sites in Park City, Utah; (AR 27, 53-54); If Mr. Davis were to stop at the Air
0,

Systems' office or a vendor to pick up items, he was considered to be on the clock and was paid
(AR 27, 54). Additional facts in the record which are not contradicted by those specifically
mentioned by the Labor Commission or in the ALJ facts adopted by the commission also would
indicate significant Air Systems control over Mr. Davis's use of their truck as follows: At the time of
Mr. Davis' death he had been working exclusively for Air Systems for about 9 months as a sheet
metal journeyman (AR 58 p. 11 lines 6 - 20) and during that time he travelled to various job sites
and company vendors in his Air Systems truck and he never used his own vehicle, a four door
passenger car, to go to work or do work errands, and he would never use the company truck for
things other than things related to work for Air Systems, including commuting to job-sites or to the
Air Systems office, implying that Air Systems did not approve of personal use of their truck (see AR
58 p. 13 line 5 through p. 14 line15); Air Systems' owner testified that Mr. Davis was required to
take the company truck in for regular service such as oil changes at a place where Air Systems

~

had an account for such service for their vehicles (AR 58 p. 31 line 24 through p. 32 line 2). Mr.
Davis was required by Air Systems as the occasion arose to use the truck to transport materials. If
19
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he drove his own car to work, a truck wouldn't have been available for him to do so. The Air
Systems owner testified that all of the employer vehicles were trucks and they had no economy
cars, indicating that because employees had company trucks they could haul things on an as
needed basis. Speaking about an employee not having a truck, he, Well, we're in the construction
11

~

industry, and construction guys use trucks, so-on the days-then it would put me at a
disadvantage on the days that he needs to haul something." (Transcript p. 35 lines 7 through 19
and p. 36 lines 2 through 8)
There are factors of control which might be construed as an indication of less control by Air
Systems over Mr. Davis' use of their truck. Those include the following: Mr. Davis was not paid for
the time he commuted directly between home and various job locations (AR 54); There is no
indication of any specific directions from Air Systems as to the route Mr. Davis should use to arrive
from home to a jobsite. That could be implied by the finding that "Mr. Davis was not required to be
at the place where the accident occurred; he apparently chose to drive over Guardsman's Pass in
order to get to the construction site rather than taking another route." (AR 55; see also AR 27)
Regarding any other specific references or facts found indicating a lack of Air Systems' particular
directions concerning Mr. Davis use of their truck, the Appellant cannot identify any others except
that there is no evidence of directions concerning particular routes of travel between his home and
job sites, and between various job sites, third party vendors, the Air Systems shops, and home.
Also there is no evidence of direction concerning a particular fuel station where Mr. Davis fuel up,
or when he should take the truck in for maintenance.
Gt)

In a general manner, employer ownership of a vehicle certainly confers employer control
over an employer vehicle used by employees even where control is not specifically asserted or
20
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indicated. It must certainly be presumed that an employer who owns vehicles and allows
employees to use the vehicles has the authority to direct how and in what manner the vehicles are
supposed to be utilized. An employer would certainly have the authority to change the directed use
of their vehicles for any reason at any time. Likewise, in the case of a vehicle owned by an
employee that is voluntarily placed in the service of an employer the employee maintains ultimate
control in the use of that vehicle. The employee would have the authority, at any time and for any
~

reason, to change or even discontinue the use of his own vehicle in the service of an e~ployerthough it would be possible, and in many employment contexts it is the case (such as in a pizza
(@

delivery job), for an employer to require the an employee to use his own vehicle for business
purposes during work hours. Nevertheless, as a factor in determining control of a vehicle,
employee ownership necessarily points strongly toward more employee control, just as employer
ownership must point heavily toward more employer control. Employee ownership of the vehicle in
question is certainly one very important reason that the supreme court in Jex, ultimately
determined that an accident during a commute did not fall under the instrumentality exception to
the going and coming rule. (see Jex, at 807

,r 39 & 809 ,r 49)

Going to the specifics of this case certainly adds to indications of significant Air Systems
control including the strong implications that Mr. Davis, in his daily work-day and months long use
of the company truck, was not to use the truck for merely personal use as he was provided the
truck only for work purposes-including the commute to and from work-such as travel to, from,
and between home, various jobsites, the Air Systems home office or shop, and materials and tools
~

vendors, along with the transportation of miscellaneous materials and tools. The indications of
significant Air Systems control of their truck as utilized by Mr. Davis are just not significantly vitiated
21
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by factors that might seem to point toward employee control such as the fact that Mr. Davis was
not paid for commute time between a work site and home, and the fact that there is no indication of
specific Air Systems' direction concerning the route Mr. Davis should take to and from a job site on
the date of the accident or any other times he commuted to various job sites over his months long
and regular use of the Air Systems vehicle. Furthermore, the Air Systems' owner's testimony that
the main purpose of providing vehicles to key employees was to ensure their arrival at jobsites
demonstrates a heightened indication of employer control over the use of the vehicle even as it
might be considered a factor which indicates limited benefits to the employer.
In fact, in terms of control, Mr. Davis' overall use of the Air Systems truck is very similar to

~

the police officer use of a police car in the Salt Lake City Corp case. (see Salt Lake City Corp) In
that case there was a finding in favor of course and scope of employment where a police officer
11

used a police vehicle in the 'Take Home Car Program and was injured in an automobile accident
commuting home to Tooele from a work meeting in Salt Lake. (Salt Lake City Corp, at 181 11 6,
181119, 1841127) In that case, obviously, the employer owned the car. The officer participants in
11

the take a car home program "were required to keep their cars clean and well maintained. (Salt
Lake City Corp at p. 181117). Likewise Mr. Davis was required to have the car serviced and keep
gas in it for commute purposes as well as other specific business use purposes. The officer
participants were required to be available to respond to emergency calls. (Salt Lake City Corp at p.
~

181117) Similarty, Mr. Davis was required to be available with the company truck when the
company needed him to transport materials or tools. It was part of the job to have a truck and be
readily available to use it when directed by the company. Although there is no indication that Mr.
Davis would be on 24 hour call by Air Systems, it was expected the company truck he had in his
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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possession for 24 hours a day be used for work purposes from the time Mr. Davis left home for
work until he arrived home from work. The Air Systems owner said all of the vehicles they
provided to employees were trucks and they had no economy cars, indicating that having trucks
generally was a benefit to Air Systems in order to haul things on an as needed basis. He said,
"Well, we're in the construction industry, and construction guys use trucks, so-on the days-then
it would put me at a disadvantage on the days that he needs to haul something." (see Transcript p.
35 lines 7 through 19 and p. 36 lines 2 through 8) That certainly indicates a significant control of
Air Systems use of the truck in Mr. Davis' possession. In the Salt Lake City Corp. case the officer
0b

participants' off duty use of patrol cars was limited to commuting between work and home. (Salt
Lake City Corp at p. 181

~ 8)

Likewise, Mr. Davis never used the company truck except for work

purposes and the specific allowance was for him to use the truck to get to and from work and for
other work related purposes. Though this requirement was not specifically stated it is strongly
implied by the evidence and the Commission finding that "Mr. Baily described that his employees
were allowed to drive company trucks to ensure their availability to work and also to use the trucks
for transporting tools and materials ... " (see AR 54)
Now a 1995 court of appeals case did address the issue of control in the context of an
employer provided vehicle. (see Vanleeuwen v. Industrial Com'n, 901 P.2d 281 (Utah App. 1995).
In that case the court determined that an employee driving to the employer business office in an
employer provided vehicle was not in the course of employment. With regard to the issue of
control, the VanLeeuwen court accepted the ALJ's finding that Vanleeuwen was not under the
control or supervision of' the employer as Vanleeuwen did not properly challenge that finding (Id.
at 285), which actually was more of a legal conclusion than a factual finding. In any event, from the
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record the appeals court concluded that employee had not yet arrived at work to receive his daily
11

II

assignments after which he would be under the control of the employer. (Id at 285) In this case,
on the other hand, Mr. Davis already knew his assignment and on the date of injury was not going
into the business office as he sometimes did. The VanLeeuwen court then indicated that the
employee "chose his own route each day and occasionally engaged in personal errands while
traveling to and from work and that the employer's control over "the employee" was no greater
11

than its control over any other employee traveling to and from work. Thus, the Vanleeuwen court
concluded that the commission's finding that the employee was not under the control and
supervision of the employer at the time of the accident was supported by substantial evidence. (Id.
at 285) In making that finding the 1995 appeals court did not consider and analyze the inherent
control an employer could unilaterally exercise in the use of its own truck. Furthermore, this case

~

is different because in Vanleeuwen there was no indication whatsoever of any overall use of the
employer vehicle by the employee for business purposes until after arrival at the employer's
business office as in any typical commute to a business office. When not commuting,
"Vanleeuwen was a 'project supervisor,' responsible for supervising other employees and for
transporting them to and from various work sites" id. at 283). Under the facts of that case, the only
overall use of the employer vehicle before arrival at the business office was a daily commute. In
this case, however, Air Systems wanted Mr. Davis to be free to leave home or leave a job site with
the employee truck and be able to choose from several options for the benefit of Air Systems
including several options other than commuting between home and a particular job site. The owner
of Air Systems, Mr. Bailey, testified as follows:
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~

"Q So far as doing the actual work, do the trucks-and I believe you mentioned earlier
that they're basically to get the guys to and from work. Do they serve any other purpose?"
[Mr. Bailey, owner of Air Systems] "A Well, yeah. They pick up materials up at supply
houses and at the shop as they (inaudible) around there. We put them on will call and they
make-they come up or-pick them up, bring them to the shop and pick-you know, there
are a variety of options there." (AR 58 Transcript p. 31 lines 8-17)
Thus, this case should be analyzed more as was the Salt Lake City Corp. case where the focus
was not on a particular commute, but on the overall regular and months long use of the employer
~

vehicle that included other business purposes. And because the truck was owned by Air Systems,
all of the foregoing facts, considered together, indicate a significant amount of Air Systems' control
over the use of their truck by Mr. Davis. Such facts should direct a conclusion of significant
employer control.

Benefit to the Employer

As indicated previously, the Jex case clarified the instrumentality exception by indicating
~

that a court must consider and balance "both the benefit to the employer and the nature and extent
of the employer's control." (Jex at 807,r 38.) The terms of that analysis exclude any necessary
determination of benefit to the employee. Furthermore, the Jex case does not make any
restatement of the indication in the supreme court Salt Lake City Corp. case that benefits enjoyed
by the employee
"are largely irr~levant to this scope-of-employment inquiry. Our focus is, instead, properly
limited to whether the [employer] derived sufficient benefits from the program to render [the
employee's] injury one that occurred in the course of and arose out of her employment. The
benefits conferred on [the employee] cannot be used to offset or diminish the significance
of the benefits derived by the City in making this calculation." (Salt Lake City Corp p. 184
,r 25)
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Additionally, the Jex court rejected any
11

general requirement of" substantial benefit" as a universal element of the instrumentality
exception. Yet we affirm a variation on that principle in the context in which it was invoked
by the court of appeals: Where employer control is lacking, a greater showing of benefit is
required to sustain the conclusion that a vehicle employed for commuting purposes is
nonetheless within the course of employment (as an instrumentality). We therefore accept
the court of appeals' "substantial benefit" standard to the extent it is consistent with the
sliding scale approach we articulate herein." (Jex, note 7)

~

Thus, we consider below whether Mr. Davis' overall regular and months long use of
an Air Systems truck was a benefit to Air Systems sufficient for that use to qualify as an
instrumentality exception to the going and coming rule when considered and balanced with findings
of employer control.
Benefits to Air Systems gleaned from the facts as we know them include factors of benefit
considered in Salt Lake City Corp. In indicating that "we are satisfied that the City enjoyed
sufficient benefits from Ms. Ross's participation in the take-a-car-home program to affirm the
Commission's determination of eligibility" (Salt Lake City Corp. p. 183

,r 24)

the supreme court
11

included several factors of employer benefit applicable to this case. One of those was to make
officers available for immediate response to policing situations. (Id.) Similarly in this case because
Mr. Davis always had an Air Systems truck at home or at work, he was always available to pick up
or transport materials or tools for Air Systems whether he was on his way to work from home or on
his way home from work, whether he was travelling between differentjobsites, whether he was
travelling between a job-site and the Air Systems business office, or whether he was at a job site
and needed to get something transported to the jobsite by picking it up from somewhere else like a
third party vendor. If Mr. Davis had taken only his own car to work and there were some materials
or tools he would not be able to transport using his four door sedan, he would be unable to be a
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~

benefit to Air Systems if the employer happened not to have had a truck on site for him to use for
that limited purpose. Mr. Davis' availability to Air Systems in transit, even in a commute to a job
site, was a benefit to Air Systems. Furthermore, the service of taking a truck to a job site for use
l.21

~

after arriving at the job site was also a substantial benefit for Air Systems. Now the Labor
Commission indicated that "Mr. Davis was not performing any job-related service for Air Systems
on the morning of the accident even if he did use the truck to transport construction materials on
other occasions." (AR 55) However, even considering just that morning commute alone, Mr. Davis
was available with a truck at moment's notice and he was taking a truck to the job-site and was

C@

thus using the truck as a significant benefit for Air Systems to have it available for transport of tools
and materials if needed later during that day, even if it could be accurately stated that Mr. Davis
was not performing an otherwise specifically recognized service while taking the truck to the job
site on the morning of the accident. In fact, in Bailey, the court found a significant benefit to the
employer in finding that as an employee Mr. Bailey had a "regular and definite duty to take the
vehicle in the mornings to the station for its use in the business. In doing so, he was performing for
his employer (himselij a substantial service required by his employment (business) at the place
and the manner so required. (Bailey, at 547; emphasis added) And under those circumstances,
the Bailey court held "that the deceased sustained his fatal injuries in an accident that occurred in
the course of his employment." (Id.) Likewise, from the pattern of use of Air Systems vehicle in this
case, it is clear that Mr. Davis taking the Air Systems truck to the job site on the date of his
accident and death, Air Systems would likely have benefitted from having the truck at the job site.

@

Furthermore, the almost universal availability of cell phones makes a vehicle used for business
purposes available for duty at a moment's notice even during a commute to a job site.
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In addition, however, consideration of benefits to Air Systems should not just consider the
morning commute to a job-site on the date of the fatal automobile accident in a bubble of time in
exclusion of the pattern and program for the use of the Air Systems truck shown by the practice Air
Systems had established in providing the truck for Mr. Davis to use on a regular and months long
basis. It was a pattern and program of allowance for the use of an Air Systems truck that benefited
Air Systems in many ways in addition to transporting the Air Systems truck as a work tool to the job
site. The Air Systems owner described such a program indicating that his "employees were
allowed to drive company trucks to ensure their availability to work and also to use the trucks for
transporting tools and materials ... " (see AR 54, see also AR 58 Transcript p. 31 lines 8-17) In fact,
in commenting on why employees were given trucks rather than economy cars to ensure their
availability to get to work testified as follows: He said, "Well, we're in the construction industry, and
construction guys use trucks, so-on the days-then it would put me at a disadvantage on the
days that he needs to haul something." (see Transcript p. 35 lines 7 through 19 and p. 36 lines 2
through 8) That is essentially an admission by the Air Systems owner that overall the use of
trucks by employees who took them home was a significant benefit to Air Systems and that the
11

lack of such use would put Air Systems at a disadvantage" when the need arose to have his
employees haul something for Air Systems. It also turned the truck into a tool of the business at a
job site and merely taking the truck to a job site along with a commute benefitted Air Systems. And
any indications of the primary purpose of the employer provided vehicles being to get employees to
work, and any indications of the provision of a gang box for tools at job sites (AR 58 Transcript p.
30 line 14 through p. 31 line 11), do not negate the essence of Mr. Davis' overall, regular, and
months long use of the Air Systems truck as a tool of his employment for Air Systems that he kept
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in his possession, by the allowance of Air Systems, 24 hours a day and 7 days a week. Certainly
the gang box at the job site would eliminate the need for daily transport of important tools and
materials, but even an occasional change of job sites indicates that Mr. Davis' use of an Air
@

Systems truck was as a tool of Air Systems business on an as needed or on call basis.
A second benefit to the employer indicated in the Salt Lake City Corp take a car home
program was "to improve the care of city-owned patrol cars ... " (Salt Lake City. p. 1831f 24) on an
apparent theory that it would "encourage in officers a heightened sense of responsibility toward
their vehicles and to make them less likely, in the vernacular of automobile care, to treat the

@

vehicles like 'rentals."' (id. at 184, 1f 26) In this case Mr. Davis was required to keep the Air
Systems vehicle fueled and had a company credit card for that purpose. (AR 27) Mr. Davis was
also required to take the company truck in for regular service for things such as oil changes at a
place the company maintained an account for such services for their vehicles. (see AR 58
Transcript p. 31 line 22 through p. 32 line 2) As part of an overall pattern and program of providing

r,771
V4!V

a vehicle to Mr. Davis, the fueling and maintenance of the Air Systems vehicle played a part as a
benefit for Air Systems in helping keep the employer provided trucks in good condition.
Now the owner of Air Systems did tes.tify that although his employees "also used the trucks
to pick up materials from supply houses ... "the main purpose of providing trucks to employees like
11

Mr. Davis was to help get them to and from a construction project." (AR 54) If course it t has been
well established that "mere arrival at work is not considered a substantial benefit to the employer.

11

(Vanleeuwen, at 285; citing various cases omitted). In fact, if that factor alone was sufficient to
@

determine in favor of an instrumentality exception to the going and coming rule, as indicated in Jex,
that factor would make it so the instrumentality exception would swallow and eliminate the going
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and coming rule in every case (Jex at p 809 ,r 49 - "the benefit of having employees show up to
11

work is not a meaningful one in light of the 'going and coming rule (which deems the ordinary
commute outside the course of employment"-ld.) However, under the Jex regime of determining
11

11

the instrumentality exception with a "sliding scale approach" in the "benefit and "control analysis
(Id. at note 7; see also Id. at 807, ,r 38) perhaps ensuring that employees show up to work should
be counted as a factor in determining the benefit to an employer, though not sufficient as a benefit
standing alone, in determining the sufficiency of a benefit in the control-benefit analysis. Now in a
case where the employer doesn't provide the vehicle and the commute is fixed, there should
obviously be no consideration whatsoever given to having employees show up to work as a
meaningful factor in the benefit analysis. But where the employer provides the vehicle, perhaps it
should be a contributing factor. Perhaps also its viability as a factor should be heightened a little
considering the often changeable nature of job sites in the construction industry, though not to the
level of a substantial benefit standing alone. But it should be considered a factor that can operate
to strengthen the overall determination of benefit if there are other benefit factors such as Air
Systems' program of providing a vehicle to Mr. Davis with at least a secondary purpose of
facilitating the picking up and transporting of materials on an as the need arises basis for the
benefit of Air Systems. In fact, in Salt Lake City Corp. the commuting elements of the take a car
home program played an important part, and thus the commuting elements were necessarily a
factor of the benefit analysis. Likewise commuting was a part of Air Systems' overall practice and
pattern of allowing Mr. Davis, on a months long and regular basis, to use their truck. Thus, in this
case, just the commute, along with the occasional transport of other employees to job sites, is also
a small, though not self-sufficient, factor in determining a benefit to Air Systems of their practice
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and pattern of allowing key employees to use the company trucks for business purposes including
the commute to changeable job sites.
Now VanLeeuwen did make a determination against course and scope of employment in a
case where the employer provided the vehicle. However, the method the VanLeeuwen court
utilized in its benefit analysis, concluding that the employee "received the majority of benefit from
this use of the truck was supported by substantial evidence" (Vanleeuwen at 285) was repudiated
by the supreme court in Salt Lake City Corp. Citing to and essentially criticizing VanLeeuwen the
supreme court in the Salt Lake City Corp. case wrote that "[t]ypically, courts have adopted the
@

methodology of dissecting the circumstances of the trip that resulted in the injury, assaying each
for indicia of benefit, assigning the element of benefit to either the employer or the employee, and
tallying up the final allocation of benefits." (Salt Lake City Corp. at 183 ,r 20; citing to Vanleeuwen,
at 285). And of course, as indicated above, the supreme court indicated that weighing the
employer benefits against the employee benefit is entirely inappropriate as the consideration of
employee benefit is irrelevant. (Salt Lake City Corp. p. 184 ,r 25) Thus, in this case, consideration
any benefits to Mr. Davis by the use of the Air Systems truck-and there are some-is irrelevant.
And even though provision of an employer truck to employees for transport between employees'
homes and job sites is not a benefit to the employer sufficient by itself to provide a significant
benefit, such provisions for use in commuting as part of Air Systems' regular and overall pattern,

@

practice and program for the employee use of their vehicles is a factor. And certainly the regular
and overall pattern, practice and program established by Air Systems for Mr. Davis use of their
@

truck provided a significant benefit to Air Systems.
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Employer Benefit and Control and the Labor Commission

As indicated earlier, under Jex, the control element and benefit to employment element
must both be considered separately. (see Jex at 807, 37-38). Then the Jex court indicates that a
"balancing" of those two factors must be part of the analysis (see Id , 38) on what the court
described as a sliding scale." (Id. at note 7). In this case there is both significant benefit to the Air
11

Systems and significant control of Mr. Davis use of Air Systems truck as described and analyzed
above. If both elements were to be placed on a the same side of a theoretical instrumentality of Air
Systems business v. non instrumentality scale, the scale would certainly come down strong on Mr.
Davis use of an Air Systems truck as an instrumentality of Air Systems business and Mr. Davis
should be considered to have been in the course of his employment when he was killed on the way
to the job site from home.
Now in coming down on the other side of the question of course of employment-- given the
evidence and considerations set forth in the foregoing discussion, the Labor Commission made two
important and erroneous legal conclusions in finding that the instrumentality exception to the "going
and coming rule" do not apply to this case. The commission indicated that "Air Systems' control of
and benefit from the truck were minimal." (AR 55). The commission also indicated that "the truck
[Mr. Davis] was driving did not serve as an instrumentality of Air Systems' business at the time of
the accident." (AR 56) The Labor Commission also erroneously compared its case to
Vanleeuwen and rejected the approach in Salt Lake City Corp.,(AR 55-56) which is the more apt

approach for analyzing this case, especially considering the faulty approach utilized by the
Vanleeuwen court in analyzing employer benefit by comparing it to employee benefit.. (see

discussion above p. 31 of this brief; Salt Lake City Corp. p. 184 , 25)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

32

In the analysis portion of their decision the commission indicated, relevantly, that the
primary benefit in providing Mr. Davis with a truck to drive to work was to ensure his arrival, or
similarly that the main reason employees like Mr. Davis were allowed to drive company-owned
trucks was to get them to a construction project, that Mr. Davis was not performing any particularly
assigned job-related service or errand for Air Systems, that Mr. Davis was not compensated for his
time commuting to work on that day or generally, and that Mr. Davis was not required to be at the
place where the accident occurred as the route he took to work was chosen by him. (see AR 55)
This analysis fails to indicate any consideration of or include any discussion several other important
factors of control discussed above such as the requirement that Mr. Davis use the company credit
card to fuel the vehicle, the requirement to take the vehicle in for regular service, the inherent
control and potential exercise of control a business owner of a vehicle retains over vehicles
provided to employees, the apparent allowance by Air Systems for Mr. Davis use of their vehicle
only for commuting and other business purposes, the consequent expectation that Mr. Davis
essentially be on call when using the Air Systems truck to pick up and transport materials and tools
for Air Systems, the failure to consider the Air Systems truck as a construction tool which Mr. Davis
took to a job site even in a commute straight from home to the job site for potential use at the job
site after arrival at the job site, as well as for potential "on call" use in transit from home to the job
site. The failure of the Commission to address such factors and considerations in an analytical
discussion certainly calls into question the legal conclusions they made. Furthermore, the
commission's analysis fails to discuss and analyze the same factors and facts previously
11

G)

mentioned in this paragraph which are also important factors to be considered in a benefit to
employer" analysis. In addition, the Commission seemed to focus only on "the morning of the
33
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accident even if [Mr. Davis] did use the truck to transport construction materials on other
occasions" (AR 55) rather than discuss and analyze the regular and months long overall practice!
pattern and program of Air Systems' allowing Mr. Davis to use their truck to commute to various
1

job sites as well as his regular use of the truck to transport construction materials tools and other
1

employees on other occasions both on the way from home to work! on the way home from work!
and between jobsites, the Air Systems business office, third party vendors! and home-and all this
essentially on an on call basis. The commission did not consider that even in taking the truck to a
job-site Air Systems was benefited by having that truck-their truck--at the job site ready to use for
a variety of business purposes. This failure of analysis and discussion of important factors and
considerations certainly calls into question the legal conclusions they made.
In addition, the Labor Commission did not follow the procedures of analysis indicated in Jex
in any discussion or analysis of the matter. The commission just kind of lumped the control and
benefit analysis into one discussion and did not show any separate analysis and discussion of
control and benefit separately and did not show any sliding scale balance analysis of the relative
strengths and/or weaknesses of control and or benefit factors. All we have in analysis from the
Labor Commission on that was a statement of some factors along with the conclusion that "Air
11

Systems' control of and benefit from the truck were minimal. (AR 55). The Commission did
reference and compare some factors in Vanleeuwen to this case, but in their reference to the Salt
Lake City Corp. case and the take a car home program, they merely mention a few of the factors in

the Salt Lake City Corp. case and they do not then make any analysis in indicating that comparison
of that Salt Lake City Corp. to this case is not apt. They just follow with a conclusory statement
11

that the circumstances surrounding Mr. Davis's accident reflect those of the Vanleeuwen case
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more closely such that the same result should be reached in this matter." (AR 56) And, again the
commission's reliance on VanLeeuwen is suspect because the Vanleeuwen analysis erroneously
compares employer benefit against employee benefit. (see discussion above p. 31 of this brief;
Salt Lake City Corp. at 184

! 25).

Because of the foregoing described failures in completeness of consideration in discussion
and analysis, the commission decision in this case merits no deference in its conclusory findings
(j

with regard to employer control and benefit to the employer or the applicability of the
instrumentality exception to the going and coming rule under the course of employment doctrine.
l&>

Such errors in analysis would constitute an "erroneous □ appli[cation]" of the law (Utah Code
Annotated §63G-4-403(4)(d). Or at least it is a failure by the commission to give a sufficient
explanation of its application of the law in order to determine whether the commission actually
applied the law correctly. An error in application of the law is certainly not entitled to deference.
The same should be said in the case where the commission's explanatory analysis does not allow
for a good evaluation of whether its analysis was full and proper. And the commission's factual
omissions could well constitute "a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency that is not
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court." (Utah
Code Annotated §63G-4-403(4)(g)). That, or the failure to utilize important facts in analysis would
also eliminate deferential evaluation of the commission decision.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing argument the appellant requests that the Court of Appeals
reverse the conclusions of the labor commission in its denial of benefits based on the commission's
35
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erroneous failure to find that Mr. Davis was in the course and scope of employment in a fatal
accident while commuting from home to a job site under the "instrumentality" exception to the going
and coming rule and that the Court of Appeals remand the matter for an appropriate award of
benefits.

DATED this 9th day of March, 2017.
BEN DAVIS LA
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
GENEINNE ELLEN DA VIS,
Petitioner;

LEWIS RAY DA VIS,
ORDER AFFIRMING
ALJ'S DECISION

Decedent,

vs.

Case No. 15-0654

AIR SYSTEMS, INC. and ACUITY
A MUTUAL INSURANCE CO.,
Respondents.

GI
Geneinne Ellen Davis, surv1vmg spouse of Lewis Ray Davis, asks the Utah Labor
Commission to review Administrative Law Judge Marlowe's denial of Ms. Davis's claim for
benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated.
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to §6304-301 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and §34A-2-801(4) of the Utah Workers'
Compensation Act.
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED
Mr. Davis was killed in an automobile accident while driving a vehicle owned by Air
Systems, Inc. ("Air Systems") to work at a construction site on August 14, 2015. Mr. Davis's
surviving spouse, Ms. Davis, filed a claim under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act alleging
entitlement to death benefits. Ms. Davis claims benefits based on the theory that Mr. Davis was
killed by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with Air Systems.
Judge Marlowe held a hearing on the claim and determined that Mr. Davis was not
considered to be working for Air Systems at the time of the accident. Judge Marlowe therefore
concluded that Ms. Davis was not entitled to benefits and dismissed the claim. Ms. Davis now seeks
review of Judge Marlowe's decision by arguing that it was error to conclude that Mr. Davis was not
considered to be working for Air Systems when the accident occurred.
FINDINGS OF FACT

·--

The Commission adopts and summarizes Judge Marlowe's findings of fact and finds
additional facts from the record to be material to Ms. Davis's motion for review. Mr. Davis worked
for Air Systems installing air-conditioning units and duct work on various constructions projects in
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and around the Salt Lake area. Mr. Davis drove a pickup truck owned by Air Systems back and fo11h
from his home to the constructions sites where he worked. Mr. Davis kept personal tools as well as
construction materials owned by Air Systems in the truck. Air Systems paid the cost of fuel for the
vehicle and paid Mr. Davis for the time he spent picking up items from vendors or stopping by Air
Systems' office, but it did not pay Mr. Davis for the time he spent commuting from home to work.
In August 2015, Mr. Davis had been working at two construction sites in Park City for about
six months. The two sites were close to each other and Mr. Davis would park the truck he drove in a
public area and walk between the two sites. On the morning of August 14, 2015, Mr. Davis was
driving the truck owned by Air Systems from his home to the construction site via Guardsman Pass
when the truck went off the road on a sharp curve and rolled down the steep mountainside. Mr.
Davis was ejected from the vehicle and killed.
Air Systems' owner and president, Duane Bailey, testified at the evidentiary hearing that the
main purpose of providing trucks to employees like Mr. Davis was to help get them to and from a
construction project, although they also used the trucks to pick materials up from supply houses. Mr.
Bailey described that his employees were allowed to drive company trucks to ensure their availability
to work and also to use the trucks for transporting tools and materials. Mr. Bailey testified that on
the morning of the accident, Mr. Davis did not stop by Air Systems' office or at a vendor and was
not transporting construction materials at the time.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
The Utah Workers' Compensation Act provides benefits to workers injured or killed by
accident "arising out of and in the course of' employment. Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-401(1). The
subsidiary rules and exceptions outlined below help define this standard, but the ultimate question
before the Commission on review is whether Mr. Davis was killed in the course of his employment
with Air Systems. See Jex v. Labor Comm 'n, 306 P.3d 799, 804 (Utah 2013). Judge Marlowe
concluded that Mr. Davis's action of driving the company-owned truck to the construction site
prompted application of the "going and coming rule" and disqualified him from benefits. The court
in.Jex, explained that under the going and coming rule, "'accidents occurring to the employee while
going to and from work' are generally not compensable because they are outside the course of
employment." Id at 803 (quoting Bailey v. Indus. Comm 'n, 389 P.2d 545, 546 (Utah 1965).
The court recognized that there are some exceptions to the going and coming rule, including
the "so-called 'instrumentality exception '-an exception holding that even in going and coming a
vehicle may be in the course of employment if it is an instrumentality of the employer's business in
light of the employer's benefit from and control over it." Id. The issue before the Commission is
whether the instrumentality exception to the going and coming rule should apply to Mr. Davis's
circumstances in light of the fact that the truck he was driving was owned by Air Systems.
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Ms. Davis argues that the instrumentality exception to the going and coming rule applies to
this case because the company-owned truck Mr. Davis was driving at the time of the accident was
under Air Systems' control and conferred a benefit to its business. The Commission is not
convinced that the instrumentality exception applies to Mr. Davis's circumstances, however, because
the record shows that Air Systems' control of and benefit from the truck were minimal. The issue in
Mr. Davis's case is similar to the issue presented in Vanleeuwen v. Industrial Comm 'n, 901 P.2d 281
(Utah App. 1995), where the court agreed with the Commission that the injured worker was not
entitled to benefits stemming from an automobile accident that occurred while he was driving to
work in a company-owned truck. The court explained as follows:
A review of the record indicates that the primary benefit to Custom in
providing VanLeeuwen with a company-owned truck was his arrival at work.
However, mere arrival at work is not considered a substantial benefit to the
employer ... Additionally, Vanleeuwen was not performing any service arising out of
and in the course of his employment on the morning of the accident. Custom did not
require VanLeeuwen to perform any job-related service or use the vehicle as a
business instrumentality while traveling to or from work. VanLeeuwen was not on an
employment related "special errand" or "special mission" at the time of the accident.
VanLeeuwen was not being compensated for his time spent traveling between his
home and Custom's office. The accident did not occur on Custom's premises, nor did
VanLeeuwen's duties require him to be at the place where the accident occurred. The
risk that caused the accident was one common to the traveling public and was not
created by duties connected with his employment. Id. at 285.
Similar to the Vanleeuwen case, the primary benefit to Air Systems in providing Mr. Davis
with a truck to drive to work was to ensure his arrival. As Mr. Bailey testified, the main reason
employees like Mr. Davis were allowed to drive company-owned trucks was to get them to a
construction project. Also like the circumstances in Vanleeuwen, Mr. Davis was not performing any
job-related service to Air Systems on the morning of the accident even if he did use the truck to
transport construction materials on other occasions. Additionally, Mr. Davis was not engaged in a
special errand for Air Systems, he was not compensated for his time commuting to work, and the
accident did not occur on Air Systems' premises. Mr. Davis was not required to be at the place
where the accident occurred; he apparently chose to drive over Guardsman's Pass in order to get to
the construction site rather than taking another route.
Ms. Davis submits that the circumstances surrounding the accident should be compared to a
different case than Vanleeuwen. She argues that Mr. Davis's use of the company-owned truck was
similar to the case of Salt Lake City Corp. v. Labor Comm ·n, 153 P.3d I 79 (Utah 2007), where the
Utah Supreme Com1 concluded that a police officer who was driving her patrol car home after her
shift and involved in an automobile accident was injured in the course of her employment. However,
in the Salt Lake City Corp. case, the court determined that the instrumentality exception applied
because of the fact that the injured worker remained on call and provided the benefit of increased
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increased police visibility, among other things, while driving her patrol car home. After considering
Ms. Davis's argument, the Commission concludes that the circumstances surrounding Mr. Davis's
accident reflect those of the Vanleeuwen case more closely such that the same result should be
reached in this matter.
Like the injured worker in Vanleeirwen, Mr. Davis was involved in an accident while driving
to work before the risk that caused the accident could be transferred or attributed to Air Systems.
The going and coming rule was therefore properly applied to Mr. Davis's situation and the record
shows that the truck he was driving did not serve as an instrumentality of Air Systems' business at
the time of the accident. Based on the foregoing, the Commission agrees with Judge Marlowe that
Mr. Davis's accident did not arise out of or in the course of his employment with Air Systems and
that Ms. Davis's claim for death benefits should be denied.

ORDER
The Commission affirms Judge Marlowe's decision dated August 12, 2016, in this matter. It
is so ordered.
Dated t h i s ± day of December, 2016.

J es n R. Maughan
U a Labor Commissioner

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order.
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days of
the date of this order.

Gw
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached Order Affirming ALJ's
Decision, was mailed on December 9, 20 I 6, to the persons/parties at the following addresses:
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Geneinne Ellen Davis
4081 W Misty Drive
Taylorsville UT 84129
Acuity A Mutual Insurance Co.
James Loiacono Designated Agent
2800 S Taylor Dr
SheboyganWI53081
Air Systems, Inc.
596 W 3560 S
Salt Lake City UT 84115
Benjamin T. Davis
PO Box 712499
Salt Lake City UT 84171
Mark R. Sumsion
Richards Brandt Miller & Nelson
PO Box 2465
Salt Lake City UT 841 IO
Kelly Graves
2800 S Taylor Dr
Sheboygan WI 53081
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
ADJUDICATION DIVISION
Heber M. Wells Building, 3rd Floor
160 E. 300 S., 3rd Fl.
P. 0. Box 146615
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
(801) 530-6800

GENEINNE ELLEN DAVIS,
Petitioner;
LEWIS RAY DAVIS,
Decedent,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND ORDER

vs.

Case No. 15-0654

AIR SYSTEMS INC.; ACUITY A MUTUAL
INSURANCE CO.,
Respondents.

Judge Deidre Marlowe

Gw

Gi.;

Hearing:
June 16, 2016
Appearances:
Benjamin T. Davis for the Petitioner
Mark R. Sumsion for the Respondents

PROCEEDINGS

Geneinne Ellen Davis filed an application for hearing on September 10, 2015,
alleging entitlement to dependent's workers' compensation benefits after the death of her
husband Lewis Ray Davis.
Respondents filed an Answer of December 4, 2015 denying the claim on the basis
that Mr. Davis was not in the course and scope of his employment when he had the accident
that took his life.
~

FINDINGS OF FACT

Lewis Ray Davis worked for air Systems Inc. installing duct work for heating and air
conditions systems. Air Systems was insured with workers' compensation insurance by
Acuity A Mutual Insurance Co. at the time relevant to this claim. The parties stipulated at
the hearing that Mr. Davis earned $21.00 per hour and worked 40 hours a week.
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Mr. Davis drove a Ford F-150 two door truck that was owned by Air Systems. In the
truck Mr. Davis kept his own personal hand tools including such things as drills, tin snips
and bending tools, and he also carried in the truck equipment and materials belonging to
Air Systems, such as ladders, a crane, sheet metal, bolts and screws, which he used to
accomplish his work.
Mr. Davis was assigned to work at various construction sites all over Salt Lake
Valley, as well as various sites in Park City, Utah. He was allowed to commute between his
home and the work sites in the company truck. Sometimes another employee accompanied
him. Mr. Davis also used the truck to pick up materials and equipment from Air Systems'
office, as well as supply vendors. He had a company credit card to pay for gas in the truck.
Ms. Davis was not paid for the time he commuted to and from work. However ifhe
were to stop at Air Systems' office or a vendor to pick up items, he was considered to be on
the clock on and was paid.
Geneinne Davis was married to Mr. Davis. She testified that on August 15, 2015 Mr.
Davis left for work at about 6:00 am as usual. He was going to a job site in Park City, where
he had been working for about 6 months. There is no evidence that he stopped at Air
Systems' office or at a vendor prior to heading for Park City.

Gi9

Mr. Davis occasionally drove to Park City over Guardsman Pass, which he did this
day. He was alone in the truck. According to the police report containing witness
testimony, the sun had come up when Dr. Davis reached the top of the pass, and his vehicle
went off the side of the road on a sharp curve and rolled down the steep mountainside. He
was ejected from the truck and died.
Mr. Davis' personal tools were recovered from the mountainside, and the truck was
eventually returned to Air Systems. There were no materials found that had been hauled in
the truck.
Mrs. Davis has paid funeral and burial expenses for which she requests
reimbursement.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

U.C.A § 34A-2-401 provides: "An employee ... who is injured and the dependents of
each such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of and in the course of the
employee's employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the accident was not purposely
self-inflicted, shall be paid [dependent's benefits].
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The Respondents argue that the Mr. Davis was simply going to work and was not in
the course of his employment when the accident occurred. This is a well-established rule
known as the "going and coming" rule. The Petitioner argues that Mr. Davis' accident falls.
into an exception to the "going and coming" rule - that is, that furnishing a truck to Mr.
Davis was a benefit to Air Systems' business and that Mr. Davis was required to use the
truck as an instrumentality of the business.
The Respondents have referred to case law in support of their arguments. The first
is Cross v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n. 824 P.2d 1202 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Mr.
Cross was traveling home from work in his own van when it exploded, causing him severe
burns and injuries. Cross argued that he was excepted from the "going and coming" rule
because he conferred a substantial benefit on his employer by traveling long distances to
and from temporary construction sites. The court determined that transportation to a job
site is not integral and necessary to employment as a construction worker, and the only
benefit conferred upon the employer by such travel is the employee's arrival at the work
site. Cross was found to not be in the course and scope of his employment, and workers'
compensation benefits were denied.

iJ

Respondents also cite to Vanleeuwen v. Industrial Comm'n 901 P2d. 281 (Utah Ct.
App. 1995). Mr. Vanleeuwen was driving a truck owned by his employer from his home to
his employer's office when he was in an accident and was seriously injured. He argued that
his use of the truck benefited his employer. However the court found that mere arrival at
work is not a substantial benefit to the employer, and that Vanleeuwen was not using the
truck for any business-related task. The claim was found not compensable.
In the present case, Mr. Davis did not stop at Air Systems' office or at a vendor on his
way to work; it cannot be said that he used the truck as a business instrumentality while on
his way to work in Park City. Mr. Davis was not using the truck for any special work errand
and would not have been compensated for his travel time that morning. The risk of driving
to work that morning was common to the public and not related to any work task. The
Judge concludes that this case correctly falls into the "going and coming" rule and that Mr.
Davis was not in the course and scope of his employment when the accident occurred. The
claim for dependents' benefits is therefore denied.

ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Application for Hearing filed by Geneinne Davis is
denied and dismissed with prejudice.
iJ

DATED this August /Z2016
Deidre Marlowe
Administrative Law Judge
Appellant Brief Addendum p. 46
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND'c()NCLUSIONS OF LAW
Geneinne Ellen Davis, Case No. 15-0654
Page4

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the
Adjudication Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth
the specific basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from
the date this decision is signed. If a request for review is filed, other parties to the
adjudicative proceeding may file a response within 15 calendar days of the date the request
for review was filed. If such a response is filed, the party filing the original request for
review may reply within 5 calendar days of the date the response was filed.
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission
conduct the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for
Review or its response. If none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals
Board, the review will be conducted by the Utah Labor Commissioner.

4i
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Geneinne Ellen Davis
Case No. 15-0654
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER was mailed on Augustl!;-2016, to the
persons/parties at the following addresses:
Geneinne Ellen Davis
geneinnedavis@yahoo.com
Acuity A Mutual Insurance Co
sclaims@acuity.com
Benjamin T Davis
bendavislawoffice@gmail.com
Mark R Sumsion
mark-sumsion@rbmn.com
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submit that.

2

THE COURT:

Okay.

3

MR. DAVIS:

Police report.

4

THE COURT:

One,

6

MR. DAVIS:

Uh-huh.

7

THE COURT:

This will be Exhibit B.

8

MR. SUMSION:

9

THE COURT:

5

10

two,

three,

four -- five

pages?

Q

No objection.
Okay.

(BY MR. DAVIS}

Thank you.

Geneinne,

I ve handed you
1

11

Exhibit B, which is the police report.

12

report you obtained from the Wasatch County Sheriff's

13

Office regarding the incident of your husband's

14

death?

15

A

Yes.

16

Q

If you could just briefly just give a

17

description of what happened that day,

18

knowledge.

19

A

Is that the

from your

Just kind of an overview.
Got up that morning and
THE COURT:

Can you lay some foundation

22

MR. DAVIS:

Okay.

23

THE COURT:

-- how it is she knew this?

24

MR. DAVIS:

Okay.

20
21

for --

4i>

~

25

Q

This is the date of August 14th,

2015, what
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we're talking about;

is that right?

2

A

Yes.

3

Q

Okay.

And you lived with Mr. Davis at your

I

@

@
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4

address?

5

A

Yeah.

Thirty-six years.

6

Q

Okay.

Do you know how long he'd been

7

working for Air Systems?
A

8
9

He'd worked a couple of different times,

but the second time,

about nine months.

10

Q

Okay.

11

A

Sheet metal journeyman.

12

Q

Okay.

13

A

Installed ductwork for heating and air.

14

Q

Was that mostly new construction or was it

16

A

Both.

17

Q

Okay.

15

Do you know what he did for that?

both?

And for this period he'd been doing

was he doing that exclusively for Air

18

that

19

Systems?

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

Okay.

22

And what was his job?

And do you know where Air Systems is

located?

23

A

Yeah.

24

Q

Approximately where?

25

A

Oh,

it's 5th or 7th West in Salt Lake.
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Do you know about the south?

Q

Okay.

3

A

Between thirty- -- 4100 and 33rd.

4

Q

Okay.

5

about?

1

2

Gw

How

far

How far was it from your house,

6

A

Half hour.

7

Q

Okay.

8

A

Depending on traffic.

9

Q

And do you know where -- with that job, did

10

he work at various jobsites and not necessarily at

11

the Air Systems main office?

12

A

Yes.

13

Q

Okay.

14

A

All over the valley.

15

Q

Okay.

16

A

At this particular point, he was in Park

Q

Okay.

17

18
19

Where was he working?

City.
Do you know how long,

A

Oh, gosh.

21

Q

Okay.

Six months?

And do you know whether he just had

one jobsite the entire time or

23

A

No.

24

Q

Okay.

25

that

he'd been in Park City?

20

22

about,

Different ones.
Do you know the particular jobsite

he was going to that day?
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I don't.

I don't.

2

which one,

3

school and -- I don't know.

4

one was

5
6

Q

I cannot say for sure

because he had done a remodel of the

Okay.

(Inaudible)

And during this time,

to the jobsite?
A

Company truck.

8

Q

Okay.

9

A

Yes.

10

Q

Was it a pickup?

11

A

Yes.

12

Q

And did you see it?

13

A

It was parked in the driveway.

14

Q

Okay.

15

A

Yes.

16

Q

So he would come home with it?

17

A

Yes.

18

Q

Did he ever take his own car?

19

A

No.

20

Q

Okay.

21

say which

how did he get

7

r

}-

A

Owned by Air Systems?

It was?

And what did he have for his own

vehicle?

22

A

A car.

23

Q

Okay.

24

A

No.

25

Q

Just kind of a four-door passenger car?

So it didn't have a bed in it?
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1

A

Yeah.

2

Q

Okay.

And just looking at, you know,

maybe

3

the last three or four months leading up to this,

4

if he had the car home at night,

5

to get to a jobsite?

so

is that what he used

6

A

Yes.

7

Q

Where are the various places he would go as

8

far as

9

he go to different places and jobsites?

10
11

A

West High.

how did he use the truck and where

Yes.

All over the valley,

a minute, because the question was,

14

truck for things other than work.

16

THE WITNESS:

17

Q

Oh.

(BY MR . DAV IS )

(iv

Other than getting to --

A

No.

19

Q

Let me clarify that.

22

did he use the

well, other than going to a jobsite?

THE COURT:

20

Q

Okay.

(BY MR. DAVIS)

Thank you.

Did he use the -- to --

other than going directly and only to a jobsite?

I

'

....

Ill
II

~

No.

18

21

different jobs.

I'm going to stop you just for

13

15

did

That just comes to mind.
THE COURT:

12

II
II
I

~

23

A

Yes.

24

Q

Where else did he go?

25

A

Supply shops.

He had to go to a shop to
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2
3

pick up materials.
Did he -- did he ever -- did he just go on

Q

the way to the jobsite or -Sometimes during the day and sometimes

No.

4

A

5

after work.

6

Q

Okay.

7

that he

8

where that was?

or,

Do you know the particular jobsite
I mean,

shop that he would go to and

I

9

A

Air Systems.

.a

10

Q

I mean --

11

A

The different supply --

I

12

Q

Different supply company,

~

I
@
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13

third-party

vendor.
Gosh.

Tip of my tongue,

too.

There was

14

A

15

one in

16

is another one that 1 s in the valley, but --

17
18

Q

I

know he went to one in Midway.

What -- what did he carry in the truck,

in

the bed of the truck?

19

A

Work supplies,

20

Q

Okay.

21

A

Different ladders.

22

Spirotech

sheet metal.

Were they -Materials that he

needed for a particular job.

23

Q

So some tools?

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

And did he transport his tools,

his own?
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1

A

Yes.

2

Q

So he used some of his own tools?

3

A

Yes.

4

Q

And he owned those?

5

A

Yes.

6

Q

Okay.

7

owned?

I

Do you know what kind of tools he

8

A

Drills.

9

Q

Just construction-type tools?

10

A

Yeah.

11

Q

Okay.

12

A

Tin snips.

Stuff he needed.

13

THE COURT:

What was that last

14

THE WITNESS:

I

~

""
~
"
"IJI
I
II
I

lit>

Tin snips and tools for the

15

trade.

16

Q

17

tools?

18

A

Yes.

19

Q

Were there tools that weren't his,

20

(BY MR.

DAVIS)

Did he have his own bending

that

belonged to the company that he would transport?

21

A

Yes.

22

Q

For example?

23

A

Ladders,

24

lifts.

25

called.

supplies,

Little lifts.

sheet metal.

Types of

I don't know what they were
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Q

But those weren't his tools?

2

A

No.

3

Q

Okay.

4

Could he have transported his own

tools in his own car?

5

A

Yeah.

6

Q

What about the ladders and the lifts?

7

A

No.

8

Q

Okay.

9

Do you know where he got those

ladders and lifts and other tools?

I

II
1/

f

10

A

Either the shop or different jobsites that

11

they were at that he went and picked up that other

12

jobs weren't needing.

13
14

Q

Do you -- do you know who paid for the gas

or how he paid for the gas for the - -

I

-I

@

}I

II

a
'

II
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-
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15

A

Air Systems.

16

Q

How?

17

A

He had a card,

18

Q

Okay.

19

How did he have them do that?
credit card.

Are you aware that he ever used his

own money to put gas in?

20

A

No.

21

Q

On the date of the accident and leading up

22

to that,

what was -- can you generally describe the

23

truck?

24

A

Describe it?

What kind of truck it was?

25

Q

Or, you know,

just generally.

Pickup we
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have established.
A

White.

3

Q

Is that the only truck he used when he was

4

working for Air Systems?
A

5

7

different truck.

I

think it

~

THE COURT:

Are you talking about the same

day?
The same what?

10

THE WITNESS:

11

MR.

12

THE COURT:

13

more than one trip on -- okay.

14

MR. DAVIS:
Q

DAVIS:

No,

not the same day.

There were more -- there was
Please clarify that.

So we're talking about the white truck,

how long had he been using that,

17

before the accident?

18

A

Oh,

19

Q

Okay.

I don't -- seven,

and

approximately,

eight months?

And before that truck,

was there

another truck he had used?

21

A

Yes.

22

Q

Do you know the circumstances of why it was

23
24

25

~

Okay.

16

20

*

I

was the second time he went back -- he had a

15

I

When he first went back --

No.

6

9

I

Two-door F-150 Ford.

2

8

'I

What color?

changed?
A

I really don't.

I

think that this one was

a little better of a truck than the one that he had.
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1

Q

The white one?

2

A

Uh-huh.

3

Q

Okay.

4

~'
'
4'
~

I

transported other employees?

5

A

Yes.

6

Q

Do you know who?

7

A

Reggie.

8

Q

Okay.

9

Was he an assistant of his, or do

you know the relationship?

10

A

A coworker.

11

Q

Okay.

12

A

14

Q

16
17

So did Reggie sometimes work on the

same job he was working on?

13

15

@'

And do you know if he ever

(No audible response.)
And how would he transport Reggie?

How did

that happen?
A

He would drive to our house and then leave

from our house.

18

Q

Reggie would drive to your house?

19

A

Yeah.

20

Q

And then he would -- when he'd drive from

21

your house,

22

A

Yes.

23

Q

Okay.

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

So when you -- when you looked in the bed

he'd go -- go with Lewis?

In the company truck?
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l
1

of the truck,

2

the things you saw in the bed of the truck.
A

3

~

,.
-I
II
II

I think,

at the time,

Lots of sheet metal,

screws,

4

miscellaneous scraps or tools or --

5

metal.

6

Q

7

10

bolts,

just a lot of

what are some of the

tools you saw?
A

8

9

And as far as tools,

tell me some of

. From time to time when he would have

ladders or -- I don't know what i t was called.
a

lift,

crane-like thing,

Like,

ii

he'd have in the back.

11

Q

Like it was big and heavy or just a --

12

A

He'd picked it up from the shop or another

13

job and then he'd come home and they needed it for

14

the job the next day.
How -- do you know how big it was?

15

Q

Okay.

16

A

It hung over the edge of the truck.

17

Q

So

18

A

The tailgate.

19

Q

Okay.

21

A

Yeah.

22

Q

Okay.

20

So over a couple hundred pounds

or

Okay.

Let's -- I've submitted the

23

sheriff's office report.

24

report of the accident that you obtained?

25

ti

A

Again,

I ask,

is that the

As far as I can tell, yes.
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DUANE BAILEY

1
2

called as a witness and sworn, was examined and

3

testified as follows:
THE COURT:

4

5

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. SUMSION:

I
1·

Will you please state your name?

8

Q

9

A

Duane Bailey.

10

Q

And what is your address?

11

A

Home address?

12

Q

Yes.

13

A

2846 North SR _32,

~

THE COURT:

14
15

me,

too,

17

Bailey, B-A-I-L-E-Y.

18

THE COURT:

19
20

Q

Kamas, Utah 84036.

Would you spell your name for

please?
THE WITNESS:

16

I

Please have a seat.

Go ahead, Mr. Sumsion.

6
7

Thank you.

D, as in dog, U-A-N-E.

Thank you.

(BY MR. SUMSION)

And what is your

relationship with Air Systems,

Inc.?

@I

21

A

Owner and president.

22

Q

In -- specifically in regards to Mr. Davis,

I

23

·t
I
<ii

was he paid for his time to travel to work?

24

A

No.

25

~

The job that he would have been going to on
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2

the date of the accident,
A

It s at 692 Main Street on the fourth
1

3

level, and the job

4

Dornich residence.

5
6

Q

Okay.

the specific job name is the

So -- and this is in Park City,

correct?

7

A

Yes.

8

Q

Okay.

9

where is it, physically?

Had Mr.

before going up to work,

Lewis gone into the shop
as far as you know?

10

A

No.

11

Q

Was he carrying materials,

12

aware of,

that you're

that were to be used for the job that day?

13

A

No.

14

Q

And you were present during Mrs. Davis's

15

testimony.

16

it 1 s called the gang box where the tools are stored

17

on site.

18
19

A

Tell us about the -- this

I believe

They're just a large metal gang box with
~

locks on it.

20

Q

Okay.

21

A

That we put on the jobsite so the guys

22

don't have to move their tools -- their tools and the

23

company tools around a lot.

24

power tools and the hand tools.

25

Q

At least, you know,

the

And is that there for a reason?
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1

A

Yes.

Because the trucks are just kind of

2

a -- to get guys to and from the project, and the

3

gang box is to keep their tools in so that they're

4

secure, because there's been a -- specifically on

5

those jobsites in Park City that we've been working

6

on, you can't park by the jobsite at all.

7

to park away from the jobsite.

8

Q

9

trucks

You have

So as far as doing the actual work,

do the

and I believe you mentioned earlier that

10

they're basically to get the guys to and from work.

11

Do they serve any other purpose?

12

A

Well, yeah.

They pick materials up at

13

supply houses and at the shop as they (inaudible)

14

around there.

15

make -- they come up or

@I

16

to the shop and pick

17

of options there.

I

18

I

@

f

,

I
@9·

Q

We put them on will call and they
pick them up, bring them
you know,

there are a variety

But at the time of this accident,

Okay.

as far as you know,

the truck

19

the truck had not

20

had not been used for that purpose; is that correct?

21

A

Correct.

22

Q

Was Mr. Davis required to take care of the

23
24
25

truck in any manner?
A

Just regular service.

We have an account

at a company that does 011 changes and stuff.
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1

Q

So he took it in if it needed to be done?

2

A

Yes.

3

MR. SUMSION:

4

THE COURT:

7

I have no further questions.
Okay.

Mr. Davis?

CROSS-EXAMINATION

5
6

BY MR. DAVIS:
Q

Mr. Bailey,

in the months leading up to the

8

date of ~he accident, were there other jobsites in

9

Park City that had been having work done on that

10

A

Yes.

12

Q

On occasion, were there more than one --

13

was there more than one jobsite actively going --

14

being worked on?

16
17

A

Yeah.

They're right up and down the street

from one another, yeah.
Q

Okay.

Isn't it true that Mr. Davis on

18

occasion would travel from one construction site to

19

another?

20

A

~

If he did in Park City,

it would have been

21

by foot up Main Street, because we're at 632 Main and

22

692 Main Street.

23

Q

Okay.

24

A

And he had to park up around

25

4b

Mr. Davis worked on?

11

15

liJ

So they were only -I can't

think of the back street name behind Main Street,

to
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1
1

the east of Main Street.

2

parking that's free.

3

have a parking pass for the Marriott,

4

know if he had one for sure.

6

Is it true,

Q

5

That was the available

And at certain points we did

though,

but I don't

on occasion he'd need

to take a ladder from the shop?
Yes.

7

A

Uh-huh.

8

Q

And was there some sort of a lift tool that

9

you're aware of?
Yeah.

A

10

Do you know what that is?

The lifting jack that's referred to

11

as a

12

for cranking ductwork up into the air.

called a high lift duct jack,

13

Q

Okay.

14

A

So you can hang it.

15

Q

If

he used that on that particular site?

17

know?
A

19

Q

21

Or do you

I do not see where he would have used that

on that site,

20

and it's used

are you aware -- isn't it true that

16

18

That

no.

Okay.

If he had to deliver that,

would he

have to temporarily park right in front?
A

22

If he had to deliver materials,

he would

23

have to temporarily park out in front of the

24

building,

25

yes.

unload,

and then move to the parking place,
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1

Isn't it true that on occasion in the

Q

2

months leading up to this accident that Mr.

3

would,

4

home to the main office for business or supplies and

5

then go to the jobsite?

6

on occasion,

A

Davis

in the work truck drive from his

If he had called in orders for something to

7

be fabricated in our shop,

8

items th~t he could not pick up for -- because most

9

of the supply houses don't open up till seven

10

o'clock.

11

there,

12

the shop, yes.

13

or typically if he needed

Sometimes he would call and have orders

and then he would pick the material up from

Q

Are you aware of a supply shop vendor in

14

Heber that he might have gone to on occasion in the

15

months leading up

16

A

17

Heber.

18

Q

No.

We don't have any supply houses in

Isn't it true

I think you've testified

19

to this,

but isn't it true that on occasion,

before

20

going to work or in the middle of the day or after

21

work, he might go to a vendor to pick up some

22

miscellaneous supplies or tools?

23

A

Yes.

24

Q

So are you aware that Mr. Davis would

25

sometimes transport -- I can't remember the name of
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the coworker --

2

A

Reggie.

3

Q

-- to his house?

4

A

That was the plan.

Reggie to the jobsite?
That's why we supplied

5

guys with trucks,

6

there and -- to and from the jobsites.
Isn't it true that if you're just trying to

Q

7

so that we can get our employees up

8

get emplpyees up there,

9

less expensive to use just an economy car and supply

10

that?
A

11

And switch out on the days that he needs to

12

haul out?

13

that with.
Q

14

15
16

it would have been more --

out."

I don't own an economy car for him to do

Okay.

So when you talk -- you say "switch

What do you -A

Okay.

Well, we're in the construction

17

industry, and construction guys use trucks,

18

the days -- then it would put me at a disadvantage on

19

the days that he needs to haul something.

20

Q

Okay.

so -- on

So at least you're saying if not on

21

that particular day,

22

business tool to haul things to and from and -- is

23

that what you're saying?

24

A

No.

25

Q

Well,

that he used the truck as a

He was using it as transportation.
you just talked about --
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1

A

He wasn't hauling any tools.

2

Q

I'm not talking about that day.

3

A

Oh.

4

Q

On a day when he had to haul something.

5

A

On days he hauled stuff, he would stop by

6

the shop or at a supply house pre-arranged and pick

7

up materials or supplies from the -- typically the

8

shop.

9

Q

So then is it your testimony that on that
~

10

day and other days when all he needed to do was get

11

to the jobsite,

12

instrumentality of the business, but on days when he

13

had to haul things,

14

Maybe that was too long.

that he wasn't using the truck as an

he was actually doing work?

15

THE COURT:

Try to rephrase the question.

16

MR. DAVIS:

Yeah.

17

Q

So basically you're saying you provided the

18

truck as a commuter just·for days when they didn't

19

have to haul things,

20

A

No,

just to commute to work?

I'm not saying that.

I'm saying the

21

truck is like a perk where I'm providing the gas to

22

get guys to the job, because construction workers are

23

notorious for not having driver's licenses,

24

out of gas all the time.

25

construction industry where you give key employees

they're

It's just part of the
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1

trucks for availability and you pay for their gas,

2

and it's something so that I don't have to pay the

3

travel time,

4

jobsite, and then also use it for tools.

6

~I
I
J

Q

5

to make sure that everybody gets to the

So that makes you -- so that indicates you

do pay for the expenses to --

7

A

I pay for their --

8

Q

--

9

A

I pay for the gas and the truck and

10

to get to the work,

to the jobsite?

insurance on the truck.

.

Q

11

I

1
I
~

I

I
I

®

J
I
4
I

,

Okay.

But then on occasion when they need

12

to haul things or go to another job, do they get

13

paid?

14

and pick something up at the shop, do you pay the

15

time from the shop to the jobsite?

For example,

16

A

Yes.

17

Q

Okay.

if somebody has to go to the shop

And it's -- and the police report

18

does talk about them finding a credit card -- company

19

credit card in the car, and that was returned to you?

20

A

Yes.

21

Q

Is that

22

A

I

23

24
25

-- I drove up to Wasatch County Sheriff's

Office and picked it up.
Q

And did you give that card to Mr. Davis

to -- for gas and for service on the car?
AR 58 -- Appellant Brief Addendum p. 69

RENEE

L.

STACY

I

CSR

I

RPR

( 8Library,
0 1 ) J. 3Reuben
2 8 - 1Clark
1 8 Law
8 School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3 7

I
I
1

I
I
I
I

I
I
I
I
I

I
I
I
I
I
I

I
I

A

I have a separate account

It's for gas.

2

for service.

3

Q

Okay.

4

A

It's a gas-only card.

5

Q

Okay.

6

So for service they go to a place

where you have an account?

7

A

Uh-huh.

8

Q

And they just do it; is that right?

9

A

That's correct.

10

Q

Did you use that credit card ever to

11

purchase materials?

12

A

No.

13

Q

Is that the same thing?

14

15

vendor, you'd have an account somewhere?
A

I have accounts at vendors,

yes.

16

MR. DAVIS:

I think that's all I have.

17

THE COURT:

Okay.

18

Any redirect,

Mr. Sumsion?

19

MR. SUMSION:

20

THE COURT:

21

Mr. Bailey.

22

Mr. Sumsion?

No,

your Honor.

All right.

You may step down.

23

MR. SUMSION:

24

THE COURT:

25

~

If you had a

Thank you,
Any other witnesses,

No, your Honor.
Okay.

(Inaudible) closing

argument, then.
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§ 78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.

Utah Statutes
Title 78A. Judiciary and Judicial Administration
Chapter 4. Court of Appeals

<.t

Current through 2/16/2017

§ 78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction
~

( 1)

The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs
and process necessary:

(2)

(a)

to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or

(b)

in aid of its jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory
appeals, over:
(a)

(i)

a final order or decree resulting from:
(A) a formal adjudicative proceeding of a state agency: or
(B) a special adjudicative proceeding, as described in Section 19-1-301.5
; or

(ii)

an appeal from the district court review of an informal adjudicative
proceeding of an agency other than the following:
(A) the Public Service Commission;
(B) the State Tax Commission;
(C) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees;
(D) the Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands, for an action reviewed
by the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources;
(E) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or
(F)

(b)

appeals from the district court review of:
(i)

~

the state engineer;

adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or
other local agencies; and
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(ii)

a challenge to agency action under Section 63G-3-602 ;

(c)

appeals from the juvenile courts;

(d)

interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those
involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;

(e)

appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a

~

conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;
(f)

appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are
incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a
challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or capital felony;

(g)

appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the
decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first
degree or capital felony;

(h)

appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not
limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parenttime, visitation, adoption, and paternity;

(3)

(i)

appeals from the Utah Military Court; and

G)

cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.

The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges of the court
may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and determination any
matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction.

(4)

The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63G, Chapter 4,
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.

Cite as Utah Code § 78A-4-103
History. Amended by Chapter 441, 2015 General Session , §7, eff. 5/12/2015.

Amended by Chapter 333, 2012 General Session, §6, eff. 5/8/2012.
Amended by Chapter 344, 2009 General Session

~
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§ 63G-4-403. Judicial review - Formal adjudicative proceedings.
Utah Statutes
Title 63G. General Government
Chapter 4. Administrative Procedures Act
@

Current through 2/16/2017
§ 63G-4-403. Judicial review - Formal adjudicative proceedings
(1)

As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to

review au final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2)

(a)

To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of agency action with the
appropriate appellate court in the form required by the appellate rules of the
appropriate appellate court.

(b)

The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all additional
filings and proceedings in the appellate court.

(3)

The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial review of formal
adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, except
that:
(a)

all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or
organize the record;

(b)

the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for the
record:
(i)

against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten,
summarize, or organize the record; or

(ii)

(4)

according to any other provision of law.

The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it
determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any
of the following:
(a)

the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action is based, is
unconstitutional on its face or as applied;

(b)
@

the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
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(c)

the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution;

(d)

the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;

(e)

the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or
has failed to follow prescribed procedure;

(f)

the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a decisionmaking body or were subject to disqualification;

{g)

the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the
agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the
whole record before the court;

(h)

the agency action is:
{i)

an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;

(ii)

contrary to a rule of the agency;

(iii)

contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the

~

inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and
rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv)

otherwise arbitrary or capricious.

Cite as Utah Code§ 63G-4-403
History. Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 382, 2008 General Session.
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